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1. The UKRI Trustworthy Autonomous Systems (TAS) Hub assembles a team from the Universities of 
Southampton, Nottingham, and King’s College London. The role of the TAS Hub is to coordinate and 
work with six research nodes to establish a collaborative platform for the UK to deliver world-leading 
best practices for the design, regulation and operation of ‘socially beneficial’ autonomous systems. 
The team share the vision that to realise the industrial and societal benefits of autonomous systems, 
they must be trustworthy by design, judged both through objective processes of systematic 
assurance and certification, and via the more subjective lens of users, industry, and the public. 
2. The UKRI-funded Horizon Digital Economy Research Institute centred at the University of 
Nottingham brings together an interdisciplinary team with expertise from a wide variety of 
backgrounds including computer science, engineering, mathematics, psychology, sociology, 
business, social science and the arts. The team is addressing the research challenge of how to 
promote deep personalization, whilst providing control and privacy to citizens, even as we develop 
new blended experiences that converge traditional and digital artefacts, services and media. 
3. We welcome the CMA’s publication of the research paper Algorithms: How They Can Reduce 
Competition and Harm Consumers, which outlines the various categories of harms that algorithmic 
systems could pose to consumers and the digital economy. In response to the consultation questions 
below, we aim to provide further evidence and perceptions based on our research to support the 
CMA in understanding the current landscape and making decisions on the next steps. 
Question 1: Are the potential harms set out in the review paper the right ones to focus on for our 
algorithms programme? Are there others that we have not covered that deserve attention? 
4. The research paper has identified a wide range of harms to consumers and competition caused by 
uses of algorithms. We agree that these are all important and urgent matters that the CMA should 
address, but would also like to point out certain harms that have not been explicitly covered by the 
paper in full: 
5. Negative psychological impacts. With empirical evidence, our research (Pérez et al, 2021) has 
shown that algorithmic decision-making processes can cause negative impacts on the mental well-
being of young people.1 These impacts include, but are not limited to, those around online privacy, 
 




safety and trust, as well as excessive screen time and related social isolation problems. Online 
algorithmic systems can aggravate these impacts by targeting users with highly revealing data. The 
so-called ‘interest-based’ approach in the online advertising and social media sector, based on fine-
grained behavioural and demographic data about users, can create highly addictive personalised 
content. Findings from our engagement with young people (Creswick et al, 2019) also show that do 
not necessarily have enough awareness or knowledge of such harms, or even show a strong sense of 
resignation,2 making it even more difficult to investigate the impact of algorithmic systems on them. 
6. Overcollection and oversharing of consumer data as a harm per se. In Section 2.1 the paper 
outlines four kinds of direct harms algorithmic systems can cause, which are certainly enabled or 
exacerbated by the collection and sharing of personal data about consumers. However, it is worth 
pointing out that even without these harms, overcollection and oversharing of data can be 
detrimental to consumers by widening the informational and power asymmetries between traders 
and consumers. While it is true that conducting market research has always been an acceptable 
business practice, the use of consumer data facilitated by algorithmic systems makes market insights 
more accurate, more available, and sometimes more intrusive. As a result, businesses as a whole will 
gain an increasingly significant informational edge over consumers compared to pre-algorithmic 
days, arguably breaking the informational equilibrium and power balance between traders and 
consumers. Our research (Cartwright, 2015) has highlighted the risks associated with the 
‘informational vulnerable’, especially consumers who have restricted capacity to understand the role 
of advertising or product effects.3 This also echoes the Furman report’s position that indirect impacts 
on consumers are not just always about costs.4 It should be noted that this is not a regulatory matter 
exclusively for data protection authorities, because such harms can emerge without violating data 
protection law, and they can also constitute aggressive commercial practices depending on the 
details of specific cases, especially when undue pressure is involved.5 Higher-level consumer welfare, 
especially in digital markets, should be monitored closely and constantly by the CMA. 
7. Discrimination against certain socio-economic groups. Section 2.1.3 draws heavily on equality law, 
which we agree is a great challenge that the CMA should look into. However, as some of us have 
previously submitted,6 regulators should also begin to consider discriminatory practices beyond 
protected characteristics, and to also cover discriminatory practices based on socio-economic 
categories. Section 1 of the Equality Act 2010, which would impose a statutory duty on public 
authorities to reduce socio-economic inequalities, is currently in force only in Scotland and not the 
rest of the UK. Nevertheless, the role of algorithms in surfacing and intensifying socio-economic 
inequalities is a crucial matter for consumer welfare and should be further investigated as part of 
the CMA’s long-term strategies. The controversies around GCSE and A-Level grading last year have 
underlined how the public may reject algorithms not only on grounds of measurable accuracy, but 
also for the very opposite reason: because they can i) lock-in pre-existing disparities, further 
entrenching inequalities and preventing social mobility, and ii) do so in an overt manner which draws 
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attention and thus demands accountability. To take the school gradings example, it is widely 
acknowledged that private schools confer advantages on their pupils, but it was only when such 
disparities were hard coded into the grading algorithm that public acceptance was lost. In this 
regard, the real challenge for the acceptability of algorithmic systems is not creating ‘accurate’, 
‘value-free’ systems (Chen, 2018)7 – which will only reflect and reinforce an empirically anti-
meritocratic status quo – but taking anticipatory, proactive steps to ensure those systems are 
designed to promote a fairer, more inclusive and more diverse society in the first place.  
8. Selective withholding of data as an abuse of market dominance. Data generated in the process of 
operating digital services, whether personal or non-personal data, can be highly valuable to all 
players in the market. Such data, however, is not always made available to the business users of the 
service, raising questions about the fairness of this practice, especially when the data collection was 
possible only when the business user or its end-users were involved in the first place. Dominant 
businesses may take advantage of its control over the data, as well as the underlying infrastructures, 
to share data only to certain partners, creating detrimental effects to other competitors. This 
process can be facilitating by algorithmic systems, leading to worsened market distortions. At the 
moment, the EU is considering regulating this practice with the proposed Digital Markets Act,8 
something UK regulators should also consider. We would also like to point out that, considering how 
individual consent has been abused by service providers, relying on consent is unlikely to be a 
helpful way forward, as consumers are susceptible to ‘choice architecture’, leaving much room for 
manipulation that would lead to over- or under-sharing of their data with third parties. 
Question 2: Do you agree with how we have described each harm, and are there other examples 
that demonstrate them in addition to the examples we have included? 
9. While we agree most of the harms described in the paper have reflected the scope and nature of the 
associated practices, some of them can be framed more broadly to cover some emerging trends. 
10. From ‘self-preferencing’ to ‘differentiated treatment’. Graef (2019) has conceptualised three forms 
of differentiated treatment in platform-to-business relations, including pure self-referencing, pure 
secondary line differentiation, and hybrid differentiation.9 The self-preferencing practices depicted 
in the paper covers mainly the first category but not the other two. It is important to note that 
offering differentiated treatments among non-affiliated business users based on, for example, the 
amount of fees, can nevertheless create anti-competitive effects. Such practices should be included 
in a broadened description of the harms. 
11. From ‘vulnerabilities’ to ‘susceptibilities’. In Sections 2.1.1 (price personalisation) and 2.1.2 (non-
price personalisation), the paper has pointed out that personalisation can be particularly 
problematic for consumers with vulnerabilities or protected characteristics. While we share the 
concerns about these potential harms, we equally feel that exploitations can also take place against 
consumer traits that are beyond protected characteristics and typically-defined, intrinsic 
vulnerabilities, such as those related to age or disabilities. Our research on the taxonomy of 
consumer vulnerabilities (Cartwright, 2015) provides a helpful framework for identifying practices of 
 
7 https://doi.org/10.21552/edpl/2018/1/7  
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/TXT/?uri=COM:2020:842:FIN Art 6(1)(a) 




exploiting such vulnerabilities, notably informational vulnerability, pressure vulnerability, supply 
vulnerability, redress vulnerability and impact vulnerability.10 Spencer (2020) has also outlined how 
online manipulation can take the form of exploiting user insecurities, weaknesses, biases and 
vulnerabilities, or even worse, creating these susceptibilities and then exploiting them.11 These 
aspects about users are not necessarily classified as vulnerabilities as such but can be equally 
detrimental to consumers. We suggest using a broader term ‘susceptibilities’ and giving further 
examples to highlight these more subtle, contextual harms. It should also be noted that such tactics 
do not always involve mis/disinformation or deception, making it harder for regulators to intervene 
under the current consumer protection legal framework.  
Question 3: How likely and impactful are the identified harms now, and how might they evolve in 
the next few years? 
12. The harms in relation to algorithmic systems that have been identified in the paper are largely taking 
place in the ‘online’ (i.e. internet) setting, but as IoT technologies become more popular in smart 
homes (e.g. smart speakers), transport (e.g. autonomous or connected vehicles) and workplaces 
(e.g. smart office), these harms may replicate and evolve in these connected environments in the 
coming years. Regulators should take a more anticipatory approach to pre-empt the potential harms 
with regard to B2C and C2C e-commerce activities based on the IoT. 
13. The increasing number of user interactive points associated with the fast-expanding IoT sector 
provides not only an exponentially growing amount of data, but also unprecedentedly more ways to 
influence consumers with algorithmic systems. For example, advertising outside the internet, such as 
in a smart city in the near future, enabled by state-of-the-arts technologies such as physical tracking 
and facial recognition, is already being explored by the industry. Some of the risks in regard to these 
developments have been identified in our research (Schraefel et al, 2020).12 Another example is 
connected vehicles, whose ability to collect a variety of data will not only have surveillance 
implications, but also bring into question the ethicality of the use of such data by, say, the insurance 
sector. 
14. Currently, the lack of platforms in the IoT economy may also lead to consumer lock-in. Personal 
information management systems (PIMS) may provide a market-based solution in the IoT context, 
but our research (Urquhart et al, 2018) has highlighted certain technical, legal and commercial 
barriers, which could be intensified with sophisticated algorithms.13 
Question 4: Are there specific examples that we should investigate further to consider whether 
they are particularly harmful and potentially breaching consumer or competition law? 
15. No answer. 
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Question 5: Are there any examples of techniques that we should be aware of or that we should 
consider beyond those that we’ve outlined? 
16. Our work (Gunes et al, 2019) has highlighted the importance to addressing vulnerabilities of AI 
algorithms with regard to data sources as well as exploitation of the algorithms.14 In relation to data 
sources, further strategies can be found in Gunes et al (2019),15 Biggio et al (2012),16 and Baracaldo 
et al (2017, 2018).17 In terms of exploitations, see Gunes et al (2019),18 Alzantot et al (2018)19 and 
Carlini et al (2016).20 We also call for the investment in developing trusted datasets that are carefully 
curated and reflective of diversity and inclusiveness for development and testing of algorithmic 
systems. 
Question 6: Are there other examples where competition or consumer agencies have interrogated 
algorithms that we have not included? 
17. No answer. 
Question 7: Is the role of regulators in addressing the harms we set out in the paper feasible, 
effective and proportionate? 
18. While the role of regulators set out in the paper is appropriate, the effectiveness of these strategies 
would depend on timely and targeted enforcement actions. As some of us have previously 
submitted to the CMA, a market investigation could help collect evidence in an independent and 
objective manner and create deterrence to non-compliant commercial behaviour.21 Our research 
(Cartwright, 2014) has demonstrated how responsible enforcement actions can create ‘credible 
deterrence’ that would improve compliance.22 The CMA’s decision not to conduct a market 
investigation into the online platforms and digital advertising sector could have released a signal to 
the industry that consumer protection and competition law would not be enforced to the highest 
standard in the UK. In parallel to the anticipation of the establishment of a new cross-sector digital 
market regulator, the CMA should also take timely actions against anti-competitive practices. 
Question 8: Are there other ideas or approaches that we should consider as part of our role? 
19. One challenge in regulating algorithmic systems to minimise their harms is that the line between 
acceptable and unfair uses of these systems can be extremely hard to draw. The definitional 
difficulties in outlining the scope of online manipulation, for example, are widely recognised.23 
Therefore, instead of focusing on the borderline, hard cases, regulators could consider a list-based 
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approach as part of the role in providing guidance as set out in Section 4.1. These would involve, 
after consulting consumer groups, civil society organisations, experts and the industry, drawing up a 
‘safe list’ with typical uses of algorithmic systems that are clearly lawful and widely considered 
acceptable, so as to create compliance incentives for businesses to adopt these solutions. At the 
same time, a ‘no go list’ should also be set up to underline the use cases that are clearly unfair or 
anti-competitive. Following the departure from the EU, the UK has now greater flexibility to amend 
Schedule 1 of the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 if practices which were 
regarded as always unfair can be identified. As noted in the paper, traders in the UK have a general 
duty not to trade unfairly and act in accordance with the requirements of professional diligence, 
which covers more than misleading and aggressive practices. The wide range of examples of 
algorithmic harms identified in the paper may provide a helpful basis for such an approach. 
